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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah. Appeals from final decisions can be made as a matter of right to the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to § 78-2-2(3 )(j) of the Utah Code Annotated. The Notice of Appeal was timely filed 
with the Utah Supreme Court on December 5, 2001. On February 26, 2002, and pursuant to 
§ 78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code Annotated, the Utah Supreme Court exercised its discretion to transfer 
this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. Theieafter, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
case pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Was the trial court in error in refusing to consi er paro1 evid ce to interpret the 
terms of an ambiguous Quit-Claim Deed? This is a question of law and should be 
reviewed by this Court under a standard of "correctness".1 
B. May a county assess taxes on real property located in an adjacent county and hold a 
tax sale following non-payment of the assessed taxes? This is a question of law and 
should be reviewed by this Court under a standard of "correctness".2 
C. Was the trial court in error in applying a four-year statute of limitations to a 
jurisdictional challenge to a Tax Deed issued by Utah County when mistakenly and 
erroneously selling real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah? This is 
1
 Upon review of a summary judgment, this court will liberally construe the facts and view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants and against the plaintiff. Lucky Seven Rodeo 
Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988). No deference is accorded the trial court's 
ruling and legal conclusions. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 
789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990). 
2
 See footnote 1. 
I 
a question of law and should be reviewed by this Court under a standard of 
"correctness".3 
RULES RELEVANT FOR REVIEW 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to summary judgment is relevant to 
the issues of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The underlying issue of this case is a determination of the actual owner of a tract of eighty-
three (83) acres of undeveloped real property located at the top of the mountain (sometimes known 
as Traverse Ridge) between Draper and Highland cities. The property lies partially in both Salt Lake 
and Utah counties. (Addendum G, R. 755.) 
Appellants acquired ownership of the property in 1993, having purchased the same at a 
foreclosure sale held by Zions Bank. Appellees claim ownership of the property pursuant to a 1998 
Quit-Claim Deed from Richard A. Christenson. (Addendum C.) 
The root of title flows from the effect of a 1984 Tax Deed from Utah County following a tax 
sale of the property. (Addendum A.) 
On July 16,1999, Appellee filed an Action to Quiet Title in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County seeking a declaration of such court that Appellee was the owner of the property 
under its 1998 Quit Claim Deed. (R. 9). Appellants defended the action by alleging their ownership 
pursuant to the 1993 foreclosure sale and resulting Trustee's Deed. (R. 15, 326). 
3
 See footnote 1. 
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The predominant issues in this case are: (1) whether the lower court should have considered 
parole evidence to clarify the effect of an ambiguous or incomplete 1985 Quit Claim Deed executed 
by "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee" to Zions Bank and (2) the questioned validity of an 
erroneous 1984 tax sale by Utah County. Utah County had mistakenly assessed and sold real property 
actually located in Salt Lake County at the tax sale. In the lower court, Appellants asserted that the 
1984 tax sale by Utah County of property located in Salt Lake County was jurisdictionally invalid. 
(R. 767.) 
At a hearing on cross-motions for Summary Judgment, the lower court refused, sua sponte, 
to consider parole evidence to ascertain the true grantor of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed, signed by 
"Richard A. Christenson, Trustee". As a result, the court ruled that the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed 
executed by Richard A. Christenson was invalid and that his 1998 Deed properly vested fee title to 
the Property in the name of Appellee. (Addendum F.) 
The lower court further ruled, on summary judgment, that a four-year statute of limitations 
on tax sales prohibited any review of the validity of the tax sale in 1984, holding that any mistake by 
Utah County in assessing and selling Salt Lake County property was not "jurisdictional". (Addendum 
H, R. 785.) 
Appellants have appealed both rulings, asserting that the 1985 Quit Claim Deed was inherently 
ambiguous on its face and requires parole evidence to clarify the real grantor thereof. (R. 73.) 
Accordingly, summary judgment was inappropriate because questions of fact exist as to the intention 
of the grantor designation. Further, Appellants have appealed the lower court's ruling that the 1984 
tax sale of Salt Lake County property by Utah County is inherently defective due to jurisdictional 
defects. Accordingly, Appellants allege that the cited statute of limitations on tax sales is inapplicable 
to these facts. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The real property ("Property") subject to this appeal consists of a parcel of 
undeveloped land located in an area located between Draper and Alpine, Utah, sometimes known as 
"Traverse Ridge" and more recently "South Mountain". (R. 234.) 
2. In 1984, the record owner of the Property was Zions First National Bank. (R. 300, 
366.) 
3. The Property consists of approximately 83 acres. (R. 234, 755, Addendum G.) The 
Property is located partially in both Salt Lake and Utah Counties. Of the Property, 77.224 acres is 
located in Utah County and approximately six (6) acres of the Property is located in Salt Lake 
County. (Addendum G, R. 755.) 
4. Prior to 1985, the Utah County Assessor mistakenly believed that all of the Property 
was located in Utah County. As a result, Utah County incorrectly assessed taxes on the entire parcel 
of land, even though some of the Property was partially located in Salt Lake County. (R. 754, 
Addendum G.) 
5. Due to delinquent taxes, Utah County scheduled the Property for tax sale to be held 
in May 1984. (R. 754, Addendum G.) 
6. Richard A. Christenson was an individual involved with the Traverse Mountain proj ect 
for many years - a project consisting of approximately 4,000 acres of land located adjacent to the 
Property. (R. 234.) 
7. On the day of the scheduled tax sale, Mr. Christenson discovered that the Property 
owned by Zions Bank was scheduled for tax sale by Utah County. Apparently, Zions Bank was 
unaware of the sale. (R. 233, 315.) 
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8. Mr. Christenson had a good relationship with Zions Bank due to prior business 
dealings and wanted to protect the bank at the sale "because that is the type of relationship we felt 
we had with Zions". (R. 314.) 
9. Mr. Christenson purchased the Property at tax sale from Utah County for the sum of 
$1,297.93. (R. 733, Addendum A.) 
10. Mr. Christenson later received a Tax Deed from Utah County. The grantee was 
"Richard ChristensoiT. Such Tax Deed was dated June 29, 1984, and recorded in the office of the 
Utah County Recorder on July 18,1984, as Entry No. 21303 in Book 2150 at Page 588. (Addendum 
A,R233). 
11. Mr. Christenson subsequently got reimbursed by Zions Bank for the monies advanced 
at the tax sale. (R. 300,351.) 
12. Mr. Christenson then executed a Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank. The Quit-Claim 
Deed was dated March 19, 1985, and was recorded in the office of the Utah County Recorder on 
September 12, 1985, as Entry No. 26380 in Book 2245 at Page 405. The grantor of the Quit-Claim 
Deed was "Richard A, Christenson, Trustee". (Addendum B.) 
13. Zions Bank later sold the Property4 to Franklin Financial, a company wholly owned 
by Mr. Christenson. Zions Bank financed the purchase and took a Trust Deed to secure the same. 
(R. 297, 300, 305.) 
14. The obligations of Franklin Financial to Zions Bank later fell into default, and the 
bank initiated foreclosure proceedings. At a foreclosure sale held on April 14,1993, Appellants were 
the successful purchasers of the Property. (Addendum D.) An agent of Mr. Christenson attended 
4
 Other property not relevant to this case was included in the transaction. 
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the foreclosure sale, made an initial bid, and observed that the Appellants were the successful bidders 
(R 298,312) 
15 As a result of the sale, Appellants received a Trustee's Deed dated April 14, 1993 
The Trustee's Deed was subsequently recorded in the offices of the Salt Lake and Utah County 
Recorders (Addendum D ) 
16 Since acquiring the Property in 1993, Appellants have treated the Property in all 
respects as their own (R 132, 295 ) 
17 Presumably because the Property was increasing rapidly in value and in order to add 
it to other properties in the Traverse Mountain development, in March 1996, Mr Christenson filed 
a lawsuit in the Third Judicial District of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No 960902187, 
styled Richard A. Christenson v. Uwe Michel, et al (the "Salt Lake Lawsuit") Mr Christenson 
sought to obtain the Property by foreclosing a purported 1978 Assignment of Contract in his favor 
which he claimed encumbered the Property 5 (R 309, 310 ) 
18 During depositions in the Salt Lake Lawsuit, Mr Christenson testified that he knew 
of no interest he held in the Property, other than his Assignment of Contract interest (R 310, 311 ) 
19 None of Mr Christenson's financial statements of that period showed any ownership 
interest in the Property (R 303, 318 ) 
20 During the mid 1980's, Mr Christenson held any interests he claimed in real estate in 
various trusts he had established for holding ownership thereof (R 300 ) 
5
 The property subject to such lawsuit included the Property subject to this action Over 200 
defendants (R 310) were named as parties to such action (Addendum E, R 293) In the Salt Lake 
Lawsuit, no claim was made that Mr Christenson owned the Property, only that he claimed a lien 
against the same 
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21. The Salt Lake Lawsuit was primarily funded for Mr Christenson by his neighbor and 
friend, Chuck Akerlow Mr Akerlow participated in decisions of strategy in the Salt Lake Lawsuit 
(R 303 ) 
22. After two and a half years of unsuccessful litigation by Mr Christenson in the Salt 
Lake Lawsuit, one or more members of Mr Akerlow's family, among others, formed a new 
corporation on December 7, 1998, known as TWN, Inc, the Appellee herein (R 357 ) The next 
day, on December 8, 1998, Mr Christenson signed a Quit-Claim Deed to the Property to TWN, Inc 
The grantor of the Quit-Claim Deed was "Richard A. Christenson" The Quit-Claim Deed was 
later recorded in the office of the Utah County Recorder on December 17, 1998, as Entry No 
132243 in Book 4904 at Page 845 (Addendum C ) 
23 Appellee then initiated this action in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County 
on July 16,1999, seeking to quiet title to the Property pursuant to the December 8,1998, Quit-Claim 
Deed Appellee asserted that the 1985 Quit Claim Deed from Mr Christenson to Zions Bank was 
defective and failed to transfer Mr Christenson's fee interest received from the earlier Tax Deed from 
Utah County (R 9 ) 
24 Appellants answered, asserting ownership of the Property by virtue of the Trustee's 
Deed of April 14, 1993, asserting the validity of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed from Mr Christenson to 
Zions Bank from which Appellants' title descends (R 15, 326) 
25 Both Appellee and Appellants filed cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (R 46, 
62) 
26 At oral argument on July 26,2000, the lower court ruled that the parole evidence rule 
prohibited the consideration of extrinsic evidence to clarify the intent of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed 
from "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee" Accordingly, this Court found that Richard Christenson 
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had never individually divested himself of the title acquired by virtue of the 1984 Tax Deed and that 
title thereby transferred to Appellant pursuant to the 1998 Quit-Claim Deed from Mr. Christenson. 
(Addendum E.) 
27. The parole evidence rule had not been raised, nor briefed, by either of the parties prior 
to the hearing - the same being raised sua sponte by the Court. His written Order was signed 
August 3, 2000. (R. 356, Addendum F.) 
28. In the meantime, Judge David Young in the Salt Lake Lawsuit had ruled on June 2, 
2000, that Mr. Christenson had no interest in the Property. His written Order was signed August 3, 
2000. (Addendum E.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER PAROLE 
EVIDENCE TO INTERPRET THE MEANING OF AN AMBIGUOUS OR INCOMPLETE DEED 
The "parole evidence rule" provides that extrinsic evidence should not be used to alter or 
amend the meaning of documents which are complete within the four corners of the document. 
However, where documents are incomplete or ambiguous, parole evidence is appropriately 
considered to clarify (but not alter) the intent of the document. 
The document in question in this case is a 1985 Quit-Claim Deed executed by "Richard A. 
Christenson, Trustee". It is impossible to tell who the grantor is of such Deed. Parole evidence is 
not only appropriate, but necessary, to clarify the incompleteness and ambiguity of the Deed. 
The lower court improperly refused to consider parole evidence in this case. Other courts in 
similar situations have considered extrinsic evidence to ascertain the proper identity of the intended 
grantor. Proffered parole evidence in this case conclusively proves the intent of the parties and does 
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not alter or amend the incomplete document. The lower court's refusal to consider parole evidence 
resulted in a decision totally contrary to the intent of the Deed. It also had the effect of ignoring/ 
overruling fifteen (15) years' of real estate transactions affecting the Property. 
The Court improperly granted Summary Judgment in favor of Appellee because questions of 
fact exist in the case. 
In addition, a ruling in the related and pending Salt Lake Lawsuit determined that Mr. 
Christenson had no interest in the Property at the time of the Deed to Appellee in December 1998. 
The lower court's ruling is inconsistent with prior court determinations affecting ownership of the 
Property. 
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPLYING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
TO A JURISDICTIONALLY INVALID TAX SALE 
A county may not tax, nor sell at tax sale, real property located in an adjacent county. Case 
law is dispositive on this issue. Statutory authority also prohibits such a sale. Any such sale in 
violation of such statutes and existing case law is jurisdictionally deficient and void ab initio. 
The lower court erred in ruling that such a situation was not "jurisdictional" and that a four-
year statute of limitations period prevented Appellants from challenging the defective tax sale. The 
tax sale, being held contrary to statute, is not a "statutory proceeding", and the cited statute of 
limitations is not applicable. Alternatively, the statute of limitations should only start to accrue when 
the "mistake" was discovered. 
Finally, the language of the Tax Deed itself restricts its effect to property actually located in 
Utah County. Any deed purportedly conveying property which lies in Salt Lake County is ineffective 
and invalid. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER 
PAROLE EVIDENCE TO INTERPRET THE MEANING 




THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE 
A. General Rule. 
The Utah Court of Appeals set forth the general rule disallowing parole evidence in construing 
a deed when it said: 
"When a deed is plain and unambiguous, 'parole evidence is not admissible to vary its 
terms'." Gillmore v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995). 
B. Exceptions to General Rule in Case of Ambiguities in a Deed. 
It is likewise understood that an ambiguous document, or deed, needs explanation which the 
four corners of the document cannot provide. In such cases, parole evidence is not only permitted 
but expected. The following statements from Utah courts confirm such exception to the general rule: 
" . . . when a contract provision is ambiguous because it is susceptible to more than 
one reasonable interpretation due to uncertain meaning of terms, missing terms, or 
other facial deficiencies, extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain the intent of the 
parties." WiIlard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co,, 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 
1995) (emphasis added). 
"Contract language may be ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or if the terms 
used to express the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more 
plausible meanings." Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 
1187, 1192 (Utah App. 1993) (emphasis added). 
"A nonintegrated contract may exist where the terms are not ambiguous, but the 
nature of the agreement itself is unclear (citation omittedO. Only when contract terms 
are complete, clear, and unambiguous can they be interpreted by the judge on a 
motion for summary judgment." Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 804 P.2d 547, 551 
(Utah App. 1991) (emphasis added). 
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"It is the general rule that if an agreement is ambiguous because of lack of clarity in 
the meaning of particular terms, it is subject to parole evidence as to what The parties 
intended with respect to those terms (citations omitted). We hold that that rule also 
applies where the character of the written agreement itself is ambiguous even though 
its specific terms are not ambiguous." Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Brothers 
Constructions Co., 731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added). 
"Note that although parole evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict the clear and 
unambiguous terms of an integrated contract, parole evidence is admissible to clarify 
facial ambiguity." Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663,665 (Utah 1985) (emphasis 
added). 
"It is also well known that the intention of the parties to a conveyance is open to 
interpretation only when the words used are ambiguous." Hartman v. Potter, 
596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added). 
Utah courts have been consistent in allowing extrinsic evidence to interpret ambiguous documents.6 
II. 
THE 1985 CHRISTENSON 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED IS 
AMBIGUOUS "ON ITS FACE" 
The 1985 Quit-Claim Deed from "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee" is ambiguous on its face. 
It cannot be determined who the grantor is from the document itself. What trust is Mr. Christenson 
the trustee of? There is nothing on the Deed to answer that question. 
During a 1998 deposition of Mr. Christenson in the related Salt Lake Lawsuit, he was asked 
that very question (R. 3 01): 
Q . . . what I'd like to have you tell me is why did you sign it as trustee? 
A I can't answer that. 
Q What were you the trustee of in the year 1985? 
6
 Although not relevant to real estate transactions, but for comparison, the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code has codified the parole evidence rule in commercial transactions at § 70A-2-202, 
Utah Code Annotated, evidencing the legislature's philosophy about parole evidence. Such statute 
provides that "contracts . . . may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a 
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented . . . (b) by evidence of 
consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete 
and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement" (emphasis added). 
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A Well, the one thing that comes to mind is I was trustee of Cape Trust but I've 
also been a trustee of a number of trusts, family and otherwise. I can't answer 
your question. 
Mr. Christenson further testified (R. 300): 
Q Other than your miscellaneous family trusts and Cape Trust, can you think of 
any trust that you were a trustee of in 1985? 
A PTA Trust. 
From Mr. Christenson himself, we know that he was the trustee of several trusts in 1985. 
How can one know from the Deed itself which trust, if any, he intended to be the grantor? Mr. 
Christenson, the man who signed the Deed, was then asked that very question, when he stated 
(R. 300): 
Q Can I tell from this document or can you help from looking at this document 
if there's anything on it that will help me understand what trust it is you're 
referring to when you say Richard A. Christenson, Trustee? 
A No, I can't. 
The lower court ruled that the parole evidence rule prohibited the consideration of extrinsic 
evidence to clarify the meaning of the incomplete or ambiguous grantor designation on the 1985 Quit-
Claim Deed, presumably finding that such designation was not incomplete, nor ambiguous.7 The 
lower court declined to consider Mr. Christenson's sworn deposition testimony from the Salt Lake 
Lawsuit. 
7
 The lower court's ruling was made in the face of contrary expert testimony. An affidavit 
of an experienced title examiner was submitted to the lower court (R. 364), indicating that the grantor 
description on the 1985 deed was incomplete and ambiguous from a title examination standpoint. 
The lower court apparently disagreed, or ignored, such expert opinion. 
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ffl. 
PAROLE EVIDENCE IS APPROPRIATE 
TO CLARIFY AMBIGUITIES 
IN THE 1985 CHRISTENSON 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Inasmuch as the grantor of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed cannot be determined from the deed 
itself, parole evidence is appropriate to clarify the intent of the Deed. As generally observed by one 
commentator: 
"Extrinsic evidence is generally admissible to identify the person or persons intended 
to be designated by the name used for the grantor in a deed. Thus, extrinsic evidence 
is admissible to identify a grantor who executed the deed under an assumed name..." 
23 Am. Jr. 2d, Deeds, Section 40, page 103 (emphasis added). 
Utah courts have stated in similar situations: 
"As in all parole evidence cases, oral testimony may not be admitted to vary or 
contradict the terms of a document; however, it is admissible to clarify the meaning 
i f ambiguous provisions. The turnout areas shown on the plats do not clearly or 
obviously portray their purpose. It was therefore proper to admit evidence to clarify 
the intended purposes and uses of these particular areas. The testimony did not 
contradict or change anything depicted on the plat and was therefore not in violation 
of the parole evidence rule." Rowley v. Man crest Homeowners' Association, 
656 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added). 
In a similar case involving uncertainty of the grantor listed only as "trustee", a Missouri court 
has said: 
"The grantee designated in the deed was "Donald Penrod, Trustee." These words 
created a latent ambiguity as they failed to designate beneficiaries of the trusts. In 
resolving latent ambiguities in deeds, the intent of the parties, primarily that of the 
grantor, is determinative and dispositive, which intent is determined, not only by the 
terms of the deed itself, but by the surrounding circumstances and conditions as well." 
Penrod v. Henry, 706 S.W. 2d 537, 540 (Mo.App. 1986) (emphasis added). 
"A latent ambiguity in the description of land in a deed or mortgage is an uncertainty 
not appearing on the face of the instrument, but which is shown to exist for the first 
time by matter outside the writing, when an attempt is made to apply the language to 
the ground. Such an ambiguity, it is practically agreed by all the cases, may be 
explained and removed by parole evidence; having been revealed by matter outside 
the instrument, it may be removed in the same manner". Becker v. Workman, 
530 S.W.2d 3, 6 (Mo.App. 1975). 
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"There appears to be no question that a latent ambiguity is presented with respect to 
the intended grantee in the two quitclaim deeds. It is said that ca latent ambiguity 
arises when the writing on its face appears clear and unambiguous, but there is some 
collateral matter which makes the meaning uncertain'. . . . And it is well established 
that parole or other extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain or clarify a latent 
ambiguity" Gibson v. Anderson, 92 So.2d 692, 694 (Ala. 1956) (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the Tax Deed transferred title to "Richard Christenson". (Addendum A.) 
The 1985 Quit-Claim Deed was from "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee". (Addendum B.) Finally, 
the 1998 Quit-Claim Deed went from "Richard k_ Christenson". (Addendum C.) Usage of a middle 
initial can also create an ambiguity which should be explained through parole evidence. Another 
court has held: 
"The erroneous use of the middle initial 'J.' created a 'latent ambiguity.' A latent 
ambiguity is an uncertainty which does not appear on the face of the deed. The 
ambiguity is created by matters outside the writing. An ambiguity of this nature may 
be explained and thus removed by clear evidence." Kratzer v. Kratzer, 595 S.W. 2d 
453, 455 (Mo.App. 1980) (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, extrinsic evidence will not vary or contradict the deed. It will solely clarify 
what was intended by explaining a term that is ambiguous - either because it is an obvious ambiguity 
or a latent ambiguity. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court: 
"There was here no attempt to vary or contradict the terms of the deed. The deed, 
while conveying appurtenances as a matter of law, was nevertheless silent as to just 
what the appurtenances were. There was a latent ambiguity in the deed in this respect 
which was a proper subject of explanation, even by parole testimony." Wade v. 
Dorius, 173 P. 564, 565, 52 Utah 310 (1918) (emphasis added). 
Or, as another Court has stated: 
"If the true owner conveys by any name, the conveyance, as between the grantor and 
grantee, will transfer title, and in all cases evidence aliunde the instrument is 
admissible to identify the actual grantor. The admission of such evidence does not 
change the written instrument or add new terms to it, but merely fixes and applies 
terms already contained in it." Walter v. Miller, 54 S.E. 125,127 (No.Carolina 1905) 
(emphasis added). 
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Due to the ambiguous grantor designation contained in the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed ("Richard 
A. Christenson, Trustee"), the court should consider extrinsic evidence to clarify the intent thereof. 
rv. 
THE OBVIOUS INTENT OF 
THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED WAS TO 
DIVEST OWNERSHIP FROM 
RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON8 
By way of proffer of proof, Richard A. Christenson has explained on three separate occasions 
what he intended in giving a deed to Zions Bank9: 
In a 1987 deposition of Mr. Christenson in an unrelated case, he stated (R. 314, 315): 
A . . . I'm furnishing you an exhibit that shows the payables. And I noticed one 
of those to Zions Bank for $284,000. That's a piece of property that Zions 
financed for one of these Myron Child related investors. And Zions Bank had 
neglected, they foreclosed on the property and neglected to pay the taxes on 
it. We were at the sale and tried to reach Zions Bank and couldn't reach 
anyone with the authorization. We paid the taxes, bought that property and 
presented it to Zions and it's worth $284,000. But that is the kind of 
relationship we felt we had with Zions. (Emphasis added.) 
In a 1997 deposition of Mr. Christenson in the Salt Lake Lawsuit, he stated (R. 351): 
A . . . that we had picked up when one of our employees was at the Utah 
County Courthouse at the time of the tax sale and we were making certain 
that all of the taxes were paid on the full contract portion. That parcel was in 
the name of Zions Bank solely and we tried to contact Mr. Noel Bennett. He 
wasn't in. My employee, Mr. Merlin Hanks, had cashiers checks and I told 
him to go ahead and to take care of the taxes which he did and we were later 
reimbursed by Zions Bank and entered into a contract with them and that is 
the parcel that you're referring to. (Emphasis added.) 
8
 It is more than obvious that Mr. Christenson believed he had transferred title pursuant to the 
1985 Quit-Claim Deed and that he had no fee ownership of the Property because in 1996 he filed the 
Salt Lake Lawsuit (Civil No. 960902187) alleging a "lien", not fee title, against the Property. 
Nevertheless, his own testimony confirms such fact, as set forth in this section. 
9
 The lower court refused to consider the cited deposition testimony and further refused to 
allow any discovery on this issue, believing the parole evidence rule "compelled" such result. 
is 
In a 1998 deposition of Mr. Christenson in the Salt Lake Lawsuit, he stated (R. 299, 300): 
Q Does it refresh your memory at all to see the stamped verbiage at the top of 
the page that when it's recorded it should go to [Zions] First National Bank? 
Does that refresh your memory at all? 
A This one is, the only thing that comes to mind is we were concerned 
sufficiently over the payment of property taxes on the property down there 
that I sent Merlyn down to Utah County to monitor every parcel that he 
thought could be under the Traverse Ridge mass description or the contract 
and there was a parcel that was owned by Zions Bank and they had called out 
the name and said it was being sold for taxes and Merlyn got in touch with me 
and says what do I do? I tried to reach Noel Bennett at Zions Bank. I 
couldn't reach him and I said rather than letting it go through sale you've got 
cashier's checks in different amounts, go ahead and pay the tax and we'll 
settle up with Zions. That may have been tied into this. That's the only 
recollection I have. (Emphasis added.) 
In the 1997 deposition, Mr. Christenson stated (R. 311, 312): 
Q Skip, I'd like to just briefly run through some of the things on discovery that 
I previously propounded to make sure the answers are still accurate. In June 
of 1996 I sent to your counsel a request for production of documents. I've 
alluded generally to those responses but I need to make sure that I'm not 
missing some documents. The first request was I asked you to produce all the 
documents that were previously recorded with the Salt Lake County and Utah 
County Recorder to support your claim of an interest in the property and 
again the only document that I received was Exhibit 1 [Assignment of 
Contract]. Are there any other documents that you're aware that would 
support your claim to an interest in this property other than Exhibit 1? 
A If there are I'm not aware of them. 
The arrangement with Zions Bank whereby Mr. Christenson purchased the Property to 
protect the bank evidences an "escrow" or "trust" arrangement. This possibly explains why Mr. 
Christenson may have chosen to deed the Property to the bank as "trustee". However, only parole 
evidence can explain his intent. Summary judgment was improper with this question of fact before 
the lower court. 
It is obvious that Mr. Christenson believed he had divested himself of any individual interest 
in the Property. Two years after executing the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank, Mr. 
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Christenson produced his personal financial statement during his 1987 deposition. Such financial 
statement did not list the Property as an asset. The following exchange took place (R. 318): 
Q Skip, preliminarily I have been given by Zions First National Bank, with verbal 
permission of your counsel, a copy of a financial statement dated March 31, 
1987, which, while not signed, appears to have been prepared by yourself or 
under your direction and I have several copies so I'll hand you a copy. I 
suppose we ought to use that as a starting point, Skip, to ask you if this was 
a statement which was prepared by yourself or under your direction on or 
about March 31, 1987. 
A Yes. 
Q To the best of your knowledge does it contain an accurate statement of your 
financial condition as of that day? 
A Yes . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Christenson also reconfirmed such statement during his 1998 deposition in the Salt Lake 
Lawsuit (R. 302-3): 
Q Skip, I'd like to show you a document which has been marked as Exhibit 1 to 
this deposition and as I represented to you off the record this was marked also 
as Exhibit 1 to a deposition in which I took your deposition in 1987. I 
represent to you that was a document which you provided to me. . . . I 
represent to you it's a copy of a financial statement that you gave me ten or 
eleven years ago dated March 31, 1987. While we were off the record you 
had a chance to look at it. Do you recognize this document? 
A Yes. 
Q Is this a copy of your financial statement of March 31, 1987? 
A Yes. 
Q To the best of your knowledge and belief is it an accurate reflection of your 
financial affairs as of that date? 
A I thought it was. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Parole evidence would easily show Mr. Christenson's intention to divest himself of any 
ownership in the Property. 
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V. 
SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST 
WHICH PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE 
The lower court granted Appellee summary judgment. Summary judgment may not be 
granted when there exist genuine issues of material fact. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56 (c). Upon review of 
a summary judgment, this court will liberally construe the facts and view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the defendants and against the plaintiff. Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 
755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988). No deference is accorded the trial court's ruling and legal 
conclusions. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 
1990). 
There are substantial genuine issues of material fact that precluded the lower court from 
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Without parole evidence to clarify the terms and 
intention of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed, it cannot be known: (1) Who is the grantor of the deed? 
(2) What "trust" does Mr. Christenson seek to represent? (3) Is the "trust" a "revocable" trust which 
would imply personal responsibility of Mr. Christenson? (4) Does the inclusion of the word 
"Trustee" result from the acquisition of the Property at tax sale to protect Zions Bank - in an escrow 
or trust type arrangement? The lower court cannot answer those questions without resort to extrinsic 
evidence because the Deed is inherently ambiguous and incomplete. 
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The issues of fact preclude summary judgment in favor of Appellee 
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPLYING 
A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO A 
JURISDICTIONALLY-INVALID TAX SALE 
I. 
A COUNTY MAY NOT TAX, 
NOR SELL, REAL PROPERTY 
LOCATED OUTSIDE ITS BOUNDARIES 
A. Utah Case Law is Dispositive on This Issue in Favor of Appellants. 
Although it appears obvious that a county cannot tax real property outside its county nor 
subsequently hold a tax sale on such property, Appellee argues that such an occurrence has given 
Appellee title to certain property in Salt Lake County through a Tax Deed issued by Utah County 
Actually, Appellee does not necessarily argue that a county can validly undertake such action, only 
that it is too late to raise the defect at this point in time due to a four-year statute of limitations found 
in § 78-12-5 2 of the Utah Code Annotated Such an argument is contrary to prior Utah case law 
The first issue before the Court, however, is whether a county can actually tax and sell real 
property located in another county, whether by mistake or otherwise 
10
 In addition to genuine issues of fact, Judge David Young had already verbally ruled (June 
2, 2000) in the Salt Lake Lawsuit that Mr Christenson had no interest in the Property (Emphasis 
added ) (Addendum E, R 293 ) "Accordingly, neither the Plaintiff [Richard A Christenson], nor 
any of the Defendants in this action, other than the four Michel Defendants, have any right title or 
interest in and to the real property which is the subject of this action" Such ruling was later upheld 
on appeal before this Court (Court of Appeals No 20000781C A) It is acknowledged that the Salt 
Lake Lawsuit dealt primarily with Mr Christenson's claim to the Property through a 1978 document 
and that Appellant was not directly a party to such action However, agents or principals of 
Appellant had funded and monitored the Salt Lake Lawsuit and were aware of its status It is noted 
that the fee ownership issue was never raised by Mr Christenson during the four years of litigation 
before Judge Young - an expected allegation if Mr Christenson actually claimed ownership instead 
of just a "lien" 
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In the potentially dispositive case of Baxter v. Utah Department of Transportation, 783 P 2d 
1045 (Utah 1989), the Court of Appeals considered whether a county could validly sell at tax sale 
real property not located in its county The court began its ruling 
This is a quiet title action to six acres of land in which defendant attached 
plaintiffs' record title by challenging the title of plaintiffs' tax deed grantor, Davis 
County, based on an allegation that the property lies in Weber County Id at 1046 
*** 
As the basis for this claim, UDOT alleged that, because the property is located 
in Weber County, Davis County had no authority to tax the property, to acquire title 
when taxes were unpaid, or to convey title through a tax deed Id. at 1047 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of UDOT on the basis that the property 
in question was actually located in Weber County, not Davis County ("Thus, according to the trial 
court, the subject six acres 'is and has always been in Weber County '" Id at 1049 ) The case is 
interesting in that it dealt with a county boundary as defined by the channel of the Weber River - the 
course of which had changed over the years 
The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the property actually lay in Davis County and that 
the tax deed was, therefore, not invalid 
As evidenced by the Stipulated Facts (Addendum G, R 755) filed with the lower court, some 
of the property allegedly sold at a Utah County tax sale is actually located in Salt Lake County In 
order for the Tax Deed to be valid as to such property, the property would have to be located in Utah 
County The Salt Lake County portion of the Property was taxed and sold under the mistaken view 
that it was in Utah County Accordingly, the tax sale, at least as to the property actually located in 
Salt Lake County, was invalid 
B Statutory Authority Prohibits a Sale of Salt Lake County Land by Utah County. 
All of the statutes authorizing a county to sell real property at tax sale limit the property sold 
to that located "within the county" For example 
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Section 59-2-213 of the Utah Code Annotatedprovides that, u[T]he [tax] commission shall 
prepare and furnish to each county an assessment roll in which the county assessor of each county 
shall list all property within the county" (emphasis added.). 
Section 59-2-301 states that, "[T]he county assessor shall assess all property located within 
the county which is not required by law to be assessed by the commission" (emphasis added). 
Section 59-2-303(1) provides that, "[P]rior to May 22 each year, the county assessor shall 
ascertain the names of the owners of all property which is subject to taxation by the county 
(emphasis added). 
Section 59-2-325 states that, "[T]he county auditor shall, before November 1 of each year, 
prepare from the assessment rolls of that year a statement showing the amount and value of all 
property in the county . . ." (emphasis added). 
Section 59-2-1001 indicates that, "[T]he county board of equalization shall adjust and 
equalize the valuation and assessment of the real and personal property within the county . . . " 
(emphasis added). 
Section 59-2-1351 sets forth the acceptable form of a notice of sale by the county. Such 
section provides as follows: 
"Notice is hereby given that on (month/day/year), at o'clock 
.m., at the front door of the county courthouse in County, Utah, I will 
offer for sale at public auction and sell to the highest bidder for cash, under the 
provisions of Section 59-2-1351.1, the following described real property located in 
the county and now delinquent and subject to tax sale." (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear that at a tax sale, one county may not sell real property located in another county. 
To find otherwise would be in violation of the express language of the applicable statutes, contrary 
to Utah case law and against the intent of the taxing system in effect in Utah. Any sale in violation 
of such rules of law is jurisdictionally invalid. 
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n. 
THE CITED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
DOES NOT APPLY TO A 
JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE SALE 
Appellee does not argue that a sale of Salt Lake County property by Utah County was proper. 
Instead, Appellee argues that it is too late to raise the issue because of a four-year statute of 
limitations on tax sales. The statute provides, in pertinent part: 
"No action or defense for the recovery or possession of real property or to 
quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or interposed 
against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years from the date of the 
sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly to any other 
purchase thereof at any public or private tax sale and after the expiration of one year 
from the date of this act. . . ." 
The term "tax title" . . . means any title to real property, whether valid or not, 
which has been derived through or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or 
transfer of property in the course of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any 
tax levied against the property whereby the property is relieved from a tax lien. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Appellee argues that such statute renders moot any defense or challenge to the sale. 
However, prior cases interpreting such statute of limitations relate only to technical challenges, rather 
than jurisdictional defects that render the purported sale void, ab initio. 
A. The Sale was Void Ab Initio. 
In Baxter, supra, the defendants challenged a 1969 tax sale. The court noted that the current 
four-year statute of limitations was not enacted until after that 1969 sale. However, the court 
observed that the earlier statute also made tax deeds "prima facie evidence of all proceedings 
subsequent to the preliminary sale [to the county] and of the conveyance of the property to the 
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grantee in fee simple." 783 P.2d at 1047, footnote l.11 Accordingly, the Baxter argument relating 
to a limitations period is similar to argument under the current statute. 
A defect in procedure of a tax sale is one thing. Statutes of repose may be enacted to prevent 
later arguments about procedure, etc. The sale of property not even located in the county holding 
the sale is an entirely different matter. The sale of such property is not authorized by law, was void 
ab initio, and such jurisdictional defect cannot later be "validated" simply because of the mistaken 
belief that the property was entirely located in Utah County. Such a concept violates due process. 
Appellee should not be allowed to bootstrap an argument that the statute of limitations somehow 
revives something that was never jurisdictionally proper to begin with. 
Appellee argues that the statute does in fact render any defense moot. Appellants point out 
the difference between "procedural" defects to a tax sale and fundamental "jurisdictional" issues that 
rendered the sale void ab inito. It should be noted that each of the three cases cited by Appellant 
uphold the statute of limitations argument for only technical or procedural defects.12 
Consider a hypothetical case where a county auditor in Juab County mistakenly puts a legal 
description on a tax deed of property located in Washington County - more than a hundred miles 
11
 The court did not rule on what effect, if any, the new statute of limitations would have on 
the outcome of the case. The court, however, clearly aware of both the old and new statutes, did not 
alter its implied conclusion that the tax deed would be invalid as to property not located in the county 
holding the tax sale. 
12
 In Peterson v. Callister, 313 P.2d 814 (Utah 1957), defendant claimed tax sale defects such 
as "failure to attach an auditor's affidavit to the assessment roll for the year the property was 
delinquent taxwise, failure to acknowledge the instruments [tax deed], etc." In Frederiksen v. 
LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981), plaintiffs contended invalidity because "the tax sale was 
conducted by an employee in the Salt Lake County Auditor's office whose appointment as deputy 
county auditor was not made in writing and filed in the office of the Salt Lake County Clerk and who 
had failed to take any oath of office, as required by § 17-16-7". In Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786 
(Utah 1992), there were claims of lack of notice of tax assessment to the property owner and other 
claims invoking federal sovereign immunity claims. All were rejected by the appeals court due to the 
statute of limitations issues. 
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away from its correct location The tax sale was held, the deed prepared and recorded, and no one 
was aware of the mistake for more than four years The property which was mistakenly "sold" is not 
developed, and no one had any reason to know of the error Appellee would argue that even though 
Juab County may have not had any jurisdiction over Washington County property, even though it was 
a mistake, the sale was valid after four years because no one knew to object Such a result would 
frustrate the title system in the State of Utah and would be contrary to the intent of the taxing statute 
To say it would be unfair would be an understatement However, a similar situation and result is 
found in this case The "mistake" was not in the legal description of the Property, but in that the 
Property was not known at the time of the sale to be outside the county holding the sale 
Appellants herein acquired the Property in 1993 pursuant to a foreclosure sale The Property 
was located both in Salt Lake and Utah Counties No one had any reason to believe that an incorrect 
tax sale by Utah County nine years earlier could conceivably impact the Salt Lake County property 
Now, another nine years later, Appellant argues that it has title to the Salt Lake County property 
because the passage of time somehow validates the improper 1984 tax sale of the Salt Lake County 
property 
This argument defies logic It does not accomplish what the four-year statute of limitations 
was designed to accomplish It contradicts the express purpose of having counties assess real 
property taxes on property located only in their respective counties To hold otherwise would allow 
counties to affect title to properties in other counties 
B. In Cases of "Mistake", the Statute of Limitations does not Accrue until 
"Discovery" of the Mistake. 
The legislature has determined that in cases requesting relief from "mistake", the statute of 
limitations does not begin to run "until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting 
the mistake" (§ 78-12-26(3))13 It is error of the lower court to apply the asserted statute of 
limitations in circumstances of a mistaken tax sale by Utah County until the owners discovered such 
mistake In this case, the Utah County error did not become known until after the commencement 
of this litigation Accordingly, the cited statute of limitations is not applicable 
C The Lower Court Erred in Finding that the Tax Sale Defect was not 
Jurisdictional. 
In its ruling, the lower court held that no tax sale may be challenged after expiration of the 
four-year period in the above-cited statute of limitations (Addendum H, R 785 ) 
The language of the statute of limitations cited by Appellee (§ 78-12-5 3) expressly only 
applies to " any sale, conveyance or transfer of property in the course of a statutory proceeding 
" (emphasis added) Any tax sale held in violation of the statutes cannot be said to be "in the 
course of a statutory proceeding" and such a defect is jurisdictional Accordingly, it is error to apply 
the statute of limitations to such a sale 
ffl. 
IN ANY EVENT, THE TAX DEED LANGUAGE 
RESTRICTS ITS EFFECT TO PROPERTY 
ACTUALLY LOCATED IN UTAH COUNTY 
The Baxter case, supra, noted that the various deeds in question, after describing the subject 
property in metes and bounds, also described that property as being "in Davis County" Such 
distinction appears to have been important to the court, as the remainder of the opinion addresses the 
issue of the county in which the property was actually located 
13
 Other statutes of limitation regarding waste and trespass to real property, certainly 
analogous to this situation, also provide for a "discovery" requirement 
The language of the actual Tax Deed in this case (see Addendum "A") indicates that the 
property sold at tax sale was only that property lying within "Utah County'' The Tax Deed recites: 
UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the State of Utah, Grantor, 
hereby conveys to RICHARD CHRISTENSON, Grantee, of 200 South Main #1200, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, State of Utah the following described real estate in Utah 
County, State of Utah (emphasis added). 
The Deed, by its express terms, limits the conveyance to property in Utah County. The mistaken 
belief that all of the property lay in Utah County doesn't magically make it so. It should be noted that 
the Tax Deed was not recorded in Salt Lake County - illustrative that no one intended it to affect the 
Salt Lake County property. 
To say that the Tax Deed also conveyed property in Salt Lake County violates not only the 
intent of the taxing statutes but the express language of the Deed which limits its effect to property 
located in Utah County. 
Even if the Court should find that the current statute of limitations prohibits any claim of 
invalidity of the tax sale or resultant Deed, this Court is not prohibited from making a ruling that the 
express language of the Deed applies only to property in Utah County. It was error by the lower 
court to ignore the effect of the language of the deed as restricting its effect to Utah County property. 
CONCLUSION 
Any deed for which one cannot tell who is intended to be the grantor is inherently ambiguous 
or incomplete. Just as the parole evidence rule should not be used to alter or change the intent of a 
document, it should also not be used to prohibit consideration of evidence clarifying the Deed's 
intention. To do otherwise in this circumstance would clearly condone something unintended by the 
Deed itself and the circumstances surrounding execution of the Deed. Substantial questions of fact 
exist which make any summary judgment order inappropriate at this stage. 
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It is not disputed that Utah County had no authority to sell real property located outside of 
such county. The statute of limitations does not apply to the circumstances of this case. This 
mistaken and erroneous tax sale is not "in the course of a statutory proceeding". 
In addition, the Tax Deed itself restricts the property sold to that located in Utah County. 
As a result, the sale was inapplicable to property actually located in Salt Lake County. 
This Court should reverse the rulings of the lower court as outlined above. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of July, 2002. 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
By: 
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants Uwe 
Michel and Ullrich Michel 
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B. Quit-Claim Deed of March 19, 1985 (Richard A. Christenson, Trustee to Zions Bank) 
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H. Memorandum Decision and Order of November 8, 2001 (Judge Taylor) 
I. §§ 78-12-5.2 and 5.3, Utah Code Annotated (Tax Sale Statute of Limitations) 
ADDENDUM A 
Tax Deed of June 29,1984 
(Utah County to Richard Christenson) 
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ADDENDUM B 
Quit-Claim Deed of March 19,1985 
(Richard A. Christenson, Trustee to Zions 
Bank) 
..... .^. - • • ; - - ' " = V ^ K U E D RETURN TO: 'v 
:f •• Jr^DOfiS ?:.=S7 fcATrl^v-it. £.'-:•. T'~."vZ I0NS FIRST NATIONAL BANK," vC •- — . ..ASSOCIATED TITLE . 




'Mail tax notice to . 
^*5;.,"V--
I 4065882 QUITCLAIM fDEE 
• *cn
 : 
/.Richard A. Christenson, Trustee ;: 
of Salt Lake City
 t County of Salt Lake QUIT-CLAIM to Zions First National Bank, National Association j Sate of Utah, herefar^^fti ciati  /c^:--'iS-^-^^B!hS 
of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah 
TEN 
and other good and valuable consideration 
the following described tract of land in Salt Lake. and Utah 
State of Utah: 




K That portion of Lots 3 and 4, and the West half of the Southwest quarter of Section 10, Township 4 South, Range 1 Bast, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, lying " ^ 
with SAlt Lake County, and also lying within the following: m 
Vo (COMMENCING at the Northeast corner of the Southwest quarter of Section 10,' 
•; JTownship 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running ^ 
^ <thance South 1320 feet; thence West 3353.6 feet; thence North 1320 feet; 
(thence East 3353.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
!U 
V 
COMMENCING at a point West 1979 feet from the Northeast corner of the Northwest 
«\ i Quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and
 ; 
^ ^Ksridi.an; and running thence South 2630.3 feet; thence West "1374.6 feet; thence 
\J vNorth 2630.3 feet; thence East 1374.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
-J-
VrrxEss the hand of said grantor , this 19th 
March , A. D. one thousand nine hundred and e i g h t y f i v e . 




STATE OF UTAH, 
County of S a l t Lake 
On the 19th 
thousand nine hundred and 85 
-rRic^axcT'A^ C h r i s t e n s o n , Trus tee 
the signer of •&'^6reg&ng mitrument, who duly acknowledge to me that he 
same. . /yVv*^ *"•"'•> * 
^ y 0f March 
personally appeared before me 
A.D. one 
executed the 
A #> \^/^t^ 
My commxscoa omits* ^7rl2-87 
Wotiry Puhfic. 
Address: B o u n t i f u l / Utah 
ADDENDUM C 
Quit-Claim Deed of December 8,1998 
(Richard A.Christenson to TWN, Inc.) 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
*vb 
QUIT CLAIM DEED 
of Salt Lake City 
QUIT-CLAIM(s) to 
Richard A. Christenson 
, County of 
TWN,Inc 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Salt Lake 
CUT 1 3 P P 4 3 BK 4 9 0 4 PG 8 4 5 
RANDALL A- COVINGTOh 
UTAH COUNTY RECORDEF 
1998 Dec 17 3:45 pi FEE 10.00 BY JRD 
S R S FOR FIRST NERICAN TITLE co 
of 
for the sum of
 t e n fay^ ^ d 0ther good and valuable consideration 
the following described tracts(s) of land in Utah 
State of Utah: 
, grantor, 




""ommencing 1979 feet West from the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Rangel East Salt 
>ake Base and Meridian; and running thense South 2630.3 feet; West 1374.6 feet; North 2630.3 feet; and East 1374.6 feet to the point of 
>eginning. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor(s), this <f^H day of B^^JLrr^JL^^ year tl't £S 
Signed in the presence of 
^ 
^&^/ d.cyA l/tstMs&yisCUb*— 
Richard A. Christenson 
STATE OF: 
COUNTY OF 
On the f ^ day of /IL4J^J\^ y e 3 r , personally appeared before me 
duly 
Richard A. Christenson 
, the signer of the within instrument, who 
ed to moTOR¥PU8fi&ecut§d the same. 






Trustee's Deed Upon Sale of April 14,1993 
(Zions Bank to Michels) 
WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: 
Uwe Michel 
8922 Cobble Crest Lane 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
4 3477649 U APRIL 93 03«52 Ml K A T I E L . D I X O N RIS5^.R',SAcT LAKE COOMTYr UTAH 
f O R I L L TITLE 
REC BT: K/W1A &LANCHAR0 i DEPUTY 
CD 
ft 
TBTffTIB'fi PWItl? y?9IT ffMJ 
THIS INDENTURE, made April /.4, 1593, between «IOHS TIMT 
KXTIOMXL BXYX, aa the duly appointed Trustee under the hereinafter 
mentioned D^cd of Trust (hereinafter referred to as "Trustee"), and 
UW7I KICSXL and ULLRICH MICHEL, as joint tenants with ful} rights of 
survivorship, (hereinafter referred to as "Grantee"). 
WITH, 
WHEREAS, JTUtfTJCLI* FIMUJCIAL, a Utah Corporation, by Deed of 
Trust dated September 22, 1986, and recorded September 24, 1986, as 
Entry No. 432C535, in Book 5820, Page 763, Said Trust Deed was also 
recorded September 24, 1?86 as Entry No. 32147, in Book 2342, at 
Page 346, in the Utah Courty Recorder's Office., of the official 
records in whe office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake and Utah 
County, Utah, did grant and convey to IIOHB TIR8T KATIOKAL BJOTC, a 
national Association upon the Trusts therein expressed, the 
property hereinafter described to secure, among other obligations, 
payment of a certain promisnory note and intermit, according to the 
terms thereof, other sums of money advanced, and interest thereon; 
and 
WHEREAS, breach and default was made under the terms of said 
Deed of Trust in the particulars set forth in the Notice of said 
Breach of Default hereinafter referred to, to which reference is 
hereby made, and 
WHEREAS, IIOH8 JI*BT HATIOWiL BA*X, the Beneficiary or holder 
of said note, did make a Declaration of Default and Demand for Sale 
upon said Trustee, and thereafter there was filed for record on 
November 23, 1992, In the office of the County Recorder of said 
County, a Notice of said Breach and Default and of Election to 
cause Trustee to sell «aid properties to satisfy the obligations 
secured by said Deed of Trust, which Notice was duly recorded in 
Book 6560 Page 0854, Said Notice of Default was also recorded in 
Utah County on December 1, 1992, as Entry No. 65853, in Book 3048, 
at Page 901, of official records in said County, and 
WHEREAS, Trustee in coraaquence of said Declaration of 
Default, Election, Demand for Sale, and in compliance with che 
terms of said Deed of Trust, did execute its Notice of Trustte'u 
Sale stating that it, as auch Trustee, by virtue of the authority 






in lawful money of the United States., the property particularly 
therein and hereinafter described, said properties being in the 
County of Salt Lake and Utah, State of Utah, and fixing the time 
and place of sale as April 13, 1993, at the hour of 10:15 a.m., on 
the front steps of the Courts Building (north side), 240 East 400 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, - nd did cause four copies of said 
Notice to be posted for not less than twenty days before the date 
of sale therein fixed, as provided for under Section 57-1-25, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; and said Trustee did cause a copy 
of said Notice to be published for three consecutive weeks in a 
newspaper having a general circulation in the County in which said 
real property is situated, the last publication being at least ten 
days, but not more than thirty days prior to said sale; and 
WHEREAS, copies of said recorded Notice Default and of said 
Notice of Sale were mailed in accordance with Section 57-1-26, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, to all those who were entitled to 
special notico of sale as in said Section provided; and 
WHEREAS, all applicable statutory provisions of the State of 
Utah and all of the provisions of said Deed of Trust have been 
complied with as to acts to be performed and notices to be given; 
and 
WHEREAS, Trustee did at the time and place of sale fixed as 
aforesaid, then and there sell at public auction to said Grantee, 
im XICH1L, being the highest bidder therefore, the properties 
hereinafter described, for good and valuable consideration. 
NOW THEREFORE, Trustee, in consideration of the premises 
recited and of the sum above mentioned bid and paid by the Grantee, 
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and by virtue of the 
authority vested in it by said Deed of Trust, does, by these 
presents, GRANT AND CONVEY unto grantee, but without any covenant 
or warranty, express or implied, all of those properties situate in 
the County of Salt Lake and Utah, State of Utah, described as 
follows: 
PARCEL 1: 
THAT PORTION OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL PROPERTY LYING 
WITHIN LOTS 3 AND 4 AND THE WEST ONE-HALF OF THE SOUTHWEST 
QUARTER OF SECTION 10, SALT LAKE COUNTY: 
COMMENCING AT THE NORTKEAST CORNER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF 
SECTION 10, TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, AND RUNNING THENCE 
SOUTH 1320 FEET; THENCE WEST 3353,6 FEET; THENCE NORTH 1320 
FEET; THENCE EAST 3353.6 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
TOGETHER WITH THAT PART OF LOTS 3 AND 4, SECTION 10, TOWNSHIP 
4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, LYING IN UTAH COUNTY. 
TOGETHER M [ I'M ALL OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 10, 
SITUATED IN UTAH COUNTY, EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE FOLLOWING: 
k 50 FOOT STRIP AS DEEDED TO THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRI I T", 
THE CENTERLINE OF WHICH IS DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
COMMENCING AT A POINT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF SECTION" 10, 1 ROM 
WHICH POINT THE NORTHWEST CORNER BEARS NORTH 5,078.2 FEET AND 
WEST 2667.8 FEET; THENCE NORTH 30 DEGREES 30 MINUTES WEST 
2829.7 FEET TO A POINT AND FROM WHICH POINT THE NORTHWEST 
CORNER OF SAID SECTION 10 BEARS NORTH 2640 FEET AND WEST 
3 231.6 FEET. 
L35SS Al ID EXCEPTING: COMMENCING AT A P OINT SOUTH 13 20 I EE ! 
FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 
10, TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND 
MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 1320 FEET, MORE OR LESS, TO 
A POINT ON THE SOUTH SECTION LINE OF SAID SECTION 10; THENCE 
WEST ALONG THE SECTION LINE 3353.6 FEET; THENCE NORTH 1320 
FEET, MORE OR LESS; THENCE EAST **2*^.6 FEET TO THE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
PARCEX , :;; : 
COMMENCING AT A POINT WEST 1979 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER 
OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 15, TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, 
RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 
2630.3 FEET; THENCE WEST 1374.6 FEET; THENCE NORTH 2 6 3 0 3 
FEET; THENCE FAST 13 74,6 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING, 
PARCEL 3 1 
COMMENCING AT THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER : F 
SECTION 10, TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT U KE 
MERIDIAN, RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 1320 FEET; THENCE WEST 1 FOC T I 
THENCE NORTH 1320 FEET; THENCE EAST 1 FOOT TO THE PUINT 01 
BEGINN;yc. 
PARCEL i 
COMMENCING AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF .'LOT 3, SECTION 10, 
TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, RUNNING 
THENCE WEST 118.8 FEET; THENCE NORTH 35 DEGREES 45 MINUTES 
EAST 24.64 FEET; THENCE EAST J 04 4 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 20' FEET 
TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING FROM PARCEL 1 AND PARCEL 3, THE FOLLOWING' 
DESCRIBED PROPERTY AS SET FORTH IN THAT CERTAIN PARTIAL DEED 
OF RECONVEYANCE RECORDED "JULY 13, 1990, AS ENTRY NO. 4940537, 
IN BOOK 6236, AT PAGJ 11085, SALT LAKE COUNTY RECORDER'S 
OFFICE, AND AS RECORDrD JULY 31, 1990, AS ENTRY NO. 24328, IN 
BOOK 2 710, AT PAGE 24»J, UTAH COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE TO KITt 
THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF THE SOU 1 HWES'T QUARTER OF SECTION 10, 
TOVfNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, IN SALT LAKE AND UTAH COUNTIES 
LESS AND EXCEPTING THE RIGHT OF INGRESS AND EGRESS OVER, ABOVE 
AND THROUGH THE ABOV2-DESCRIBFi3 PARCEL OF REAL PROPERTY 
IH WITNESS WHEREOF, said HOWS TIJU5T JQTXOKXL BAXX, 
Trustee, has tftis day caused its name to be hereunto affixed. 
2IONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
in its capacity as Trustee 
By te^&SH^tk^' 
Gregory 6. Taylor 
I t s : Vice PresIdent 
1
 1 A I 1 i i II I ! II ii II III 
COUNT* OF Sh\ ] .-*r . ) 
s s . 
'The foregoii i<j "I i ustee's D#aci upon sale was acknowledged bofor e 
me this 14th day of April, 1993, by GREGORY 0. TAYLOR, the Vice 
President of zJONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ^ NHttOTa} Association 
My Commission Expire*. 
NOTARY tVSLIC 
Residing At: 




My Conmtatton EioJr*» • 
WoWmb* 10. !»ft3 I 
^DENDl I 
Order of Summary Judgment of 
000 
(Judge Young in Salt Lake Lawsuit) 
Bruce J. Nelsen (2380) 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CI IR1STF.NSI-N P( 
576 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: r01) 531-8400 
Facsimile: tool) 363-3614 
Attorneys for Defendants Michel 
FjUD OISTBICT COIIBT 
L.K X 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
DaputyCteflT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SAI I OI-'UTAH 
RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON, 
l amt i l l . 
v. 
UWE MICHEL and ANNETTE S. MICHEL, 
husband and wife, and ULLRICH MICHEL 
and CAROLA S. MICHEL, husband and will 
as joint tenants; JAY V. BECK and FA YE E. 
BECK, husband and wife, KENNETH J. BECK 
and MARILYN BECK, husband and wife; 
AFTON W. BULLOCK; GLADYS BECK; 
SHIRLEY B. NASH; DAN C. SIMONS; 
BECK LAND, INC., trustee; DAN C. SIMONS 
EQUITY TRUST, DAN C. SIMONS 
TRUSTEE, executed by BECK LAND, INC., 
a 1 Ttah Corporation; ALPINE. LTD., a Utah 
i.imited Partnership; KINGS SIX, INC., a 
Uiaii Corporation; LAND WEST, INC., and 
PARLEY BAKER; THOMAS E. SAWYER; 
NEW EMPIRE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation; MYRON B. CHILD, JR.; 
GEORGE GAWAN; BEC DEVELOPMENT, 
INC., W. K. ETHINGTON and ROLAYNE 
ETHINGTON, his wife; B.E.C. DEVELOP-
MENT; DAVID Y PETERS and EDWARD 
J)ER OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
CiviiNo. 960902187 
.iuagc i ...x ,w • \ viung 
IMAGED 
win ci UXKi i \ HNANC 
Corporation, andNl-Vv 1 MPIRh DLVLLUPMLN J 
COMPANY, a Partnership, M. B. CHILD ANT) 
ASSOCIATES and MYRON B. CHILD, 
individual]}; JACK M. STEVENS, JARRhlT S 
JARVIS and PATRICIA Q. JARVIS; ESTES 
HOMES, an Arizona general partnership; UTAH 
PALISADES CORPORATION; ASSOCIATED 
PROPERTY INVESTORS; DAN C. SIMONS 
EQUITY TRUST. DAN C. SIMONS. Trustee; 
PACE INDUSTRIAL CENTER; JUDY PACE 
BILLINGS, as Trustee for the DAVID R. PACF 
FAMILY TRUST; MICHAEL W. McBRIDE; 
RICHARD F. McKEAN; D. CLARK BROWN and 
RUSSELL W. CARRUTH; RICHARDS HAWKS 
ASSOC; DAN C. SIMONS EQUITY TRUST, 
a Family Estate c/o H. MARK SIMONS, trustee-
ELIN CHILD, aka ELIN S. CHILD; MARVIN K 
CURTIS, JR.; J. McDONALD BRUBAKER and 
SCOTT M. BRUBAKER; CENTURY GENERAL 
CORPORATION a Utah Corporation; 
THEODORE D. GARFIELD, GARFIELD, 
ASSOCIATES; GARNDER ENGINEERING; 
OLYMPUS AERIAL SURVEYS INC.; GORDON 
JOSEPH ANDERSON AND FRANCES JOYCE 
ANDERSON; RAYMOND MALLORY; 
CHARLES W. TAGGART. INVESTORS 
COOPERATIVE, INC.; O.L. HOLEY (aka O I 
HOLLEY): MAX E. BAKER: R. R. 
SCHEIDERIDER; DON I. HANSEN and 
BARBARA HANSEN; BECK LAND, INC., 
trustee, ALPINE, LTD.; Notice of Federal Tax Lien 
in the amount of $11.595.27 against CHARLES W 
TAGGART and in favor of the United States of 
America; Notice of Federal Tax Lien in the 
amount of $5,981 31 against CHARLES W. 
TAGGART and in favor of the United States of 
America; Lien of Judgment in favor of IHC 
HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah Corporation, d/b/u 
CREDIT ASSURANCE AGENCY as Creditor 
wherein ELIN CHILD and MYRON CHILD 
appear as Debtor; Lien of Judgment in favor 
of ST ANT RY BELNAP as Creditor wherein 
2 
MICHAEL W. McBRIDE and FIRST SECURITY 
BANK OF IDAHO appears as Debtor; Lien of 
Judgment in favor of UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION as Creditor wherein DAVID 
BROWN appears as Debtor; Notice of Federal Tax 
Lien in the amount of $38,288.40, against DANNY 
C. and SALLY J. SIMONS and in favor of the 
United State of America; Lien of Judgment in 
favor of DANNY J. JENSEN as Creditor wherein 
MARVIN R. CURTIS, JR. and CURTIS TECH-
NOLOGIES, INC. appears as Debtor; Lien of 
Judgment in favor of UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION as Creditor wherein CHARLES W. 
TAGGART appears as Debtor; Lien of Judgment in 
favor of ROBERT FEHR as Creditor wherein 
MICHAEL McBRIDE appears as Debtor; Lien of 
Judgment in favor of EMPIRE MILL & CABINET 
as Creditor wherein KITCHEN DESIGN STUDIO 
and DAVID BROWN, individually appears as 
Debtor, dated December 15,1989 and entered 
December 20, 1989; Lien of Judgment in favor of 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES as 
Creditor wherein KENT BRENT BERRIEL appear 
as and Defendant FRANCES ANDERSON aka 
FRANCINE ZAMORE appears as Party-
Defendant, dated December 27,1989; Lien of 
Judgment in favor of FIRST SECURITY 
FINANCIAL, a corporation as Creditor wherein 
RICHARD McKEAN, et al. appear as Debtors; 
Lien of Judgment in favor of UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION as Creditor wherein MARVIN R. 
CURTIS, JR., JOHN C. CURTIS, JR. appear as 
Debtors; Notice of Federal Tax Lien in the amount 
of $50,599.04 against DAN C. SIMONS EQUITY 
TRUST, ALTER EGO, NOMINEE, AGENT OR 
TRANSFEREE OF DAN C. & SALLY J. 
SIMONS and in favor of the United States of 
America; Notice of Federal Tax Lien in the 
amount of $50,599.04 against CHARLEMAGNE 
TRUST, ALTER EGO, NOMINEE, AGENT OR 
TRANSFEREE OF DAN C. & SALLY J. SIMONS 
3 
and in favor of the United States of America; 
Notice of Federal Tax lien in the amount of 
$38,288.40 against DAN C. & SALLY J. 
SIMONS and in favor of the United States of 
America; Lien of Judgment in favor of INTER-
MOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, d/b/a CREDIT ASSURANCE 
AGENCY as Creditor wherein DWIGHT BROWN 
and BEVERLY BROWN appear as Debtors; 
Lien of Judgment in favor of UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION as Creditor wherein MARVIN 
R. CURTIS, JR. and JOAN C. CURTIS, JR., 
appear as Debtors; Lien of Judgment in favor of 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor 
wherein JOAN C. CURTIS, JR. and MARVIN R. 
CURTIS, JR. appear as Debtors; Lien of Judgment 
in the amount of $2,044.78 in favor of UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor wherein 
BARBARA HANSEN appears as Debtor, Lien of 
Judgment in the amount of $2,859.32 in favor of 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor 
wherein BARBARA HANSEN appears as 
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of 
$3,226.88 in favor of UTAH STATE TAX COM-
MISSION as Creditor wherein BARBARA 
HANSEN appears as Debtor; Lien of Judgment in 
the amount of $3,666.56 in favor of the UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor wherein 
BARBARA HANSEN appears as Debtor; Lien of 
Judgment in the amount of $2,632.45 in favor of 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor 
wherein BARBARA HANSEN appears as Debtor, 
Lien of Judgment in the amount of $2,555.59 in 
favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as 
Creditor wherein BARBARA HANSEN appear as 
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of 
$1,251.09 in favor of UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION as Creditor wherein DANIEL C. 
BROWN appears as Debtor; Lien of Judgment in 
the amount of $1,499.82 in favor of UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION as Creditor wherein DANIEL 
C. BROWN appears as Debtor; Lien of Judgment 
4 
in the amount of $1,752.42 in favor of UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor wherein 
DANIEL C. BROWN appears as Debtor; Lien of 
Judgment in the amount of $1,345.45 in favor of 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor 
whrein DANIEL C. BROWN appears as Debtor; 
Lien of Judgment in the amount of $2,044.95 in 
favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as 
Creditor wherein DANIEL C. BROWN appears as 
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of $532.72 
in favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as 
Creditor wherein DANIEL C. BROWN appears as 
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of $157.12 
in favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as 
Creditor wherein DANIEL C. BROWN appears as 
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of 
$2,760.00 in favor of PEAY RENTALS, INC, as 
Creditor wherein PARLEY BAKER appears as 
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of $286.12 
in favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as 
Creditor wherein JANET K. HANSEN and DON 
HANSEN appear as Debtors; DENNIS BROWN 
and VICKIE BROWN, Debtor; NEW EMPIRE 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation; MYRON S. CHILD, JR., JUDY 
PACE BILLINGS, as Trustee for the DAVID K. 
PACE FAMILY TRUST; RONALD S. COOK, 
RAY W. LAMOREAUX, and WENDELL P. 
HANSEN; PONDEROSA ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
limited partnership Notice of Federal Lien in the 
amount of $500.00, against RICHARDS HAWKS 
ASSOC, JUDGE L. HAWKS, PTR, in favor of 
the United States of America; Notice of Federal 
Tax Lien in the amount of $510.00 against 
DANIEL CLARK BROWN and in favor of the 
United States of America; ALL AS IT APPLIES 




Defendants Michels' Motion For Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the above-
entitled court on Friday, June 2, 2000. Bruce J. Nelson, Esq., was present and represented the 
interests of Defendants Uwe Michel, Annette Michel, Carola Michel, and Ullrich Michel, the moving 
parties. Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Esq., was present and represented the interests of the Plaintiff 
Richard A. Christenson. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and documents on file herein; 
having found that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving parties are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law; having noted that the Plaintiff had no objection to the 
granting of an Order of Summary Judgment; and the Court noting that all other Defendants have 
either failed to respond or have filed Disclaimers of Interest in and to the real property which is the 
subject of this action, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendants Michels' Motion For Summary Judgment is granted. Accordingly, 
neither the Plaintiff, nor any of the Defendants in this action other than the four Michel Defendants, 
have any right, title or interest in and to the real property which is the subject of this action. Such 
real property is further described on the attached Exhibit "A". 
DATED this p - day oO^fSOOO. 
BY THE COURT 
,w>i 
DAVID S. YOUl\( 
District Court Judg&^^f 
6 
EXHIBIT "A" 
THE LAND PARCEL 1: LOCATED IN THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH, AND 
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
The surface rights only in and to the following described property; That part of Lot 1 and part of 
the Northwest Quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian lying within Salt Lake County. 
Commencing at point West 1979 feet from the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter of said 
Section 15; and running thence South 2630.3 feet; thence West 1374.6 feet; thence North 2630.3 
feet; thence East 1374.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
THE LAND PARCEL 2: LOCATED IN THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH, AND 
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
COMMENCING at a point North 00°17f13M East 1318.08 feet from the Southwest Corner of 
Section 10, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 
89°52'00M West 96.23 feet; thence North 35°45'00" East 1187.25 feet; thence North 85°44'00n 
East 732.71 feet; thence South 00°1718M East 1014.75 feet; thence South 89°52,00H West 
1333.21 feet to the point of beginning. 
THE LAND PARCEL 3: LOCATED IN THE COUNTIES OF UTAH and SALT LAKE, 
STATE OF UTAH, AND DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
The surface rights only in and to the following described property: That portion of Lot 3 and the 
West half of the Southwest quarter of Section 10, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, Salt Lake County, lying within the following described Tract: Commencing 
at the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of said Section 10; and running thence South 
1320 feet; thence West 3353.6 feet; thence North 1320 feet; thence East 3353.6 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Excepting therefrom all of the land heretofore conveyed to the Metropolitan Water District for 
the purposes of Alpine Draper Aqueduct (Tunnel): a-50-foot-strip, the center line of which is 
described as follows: 
Commencing at a point on the South line of said Section 10, from which point the Northwest 
corner bears North 5078.2 feet; thence North 30°30' West 2829.7 feet to a point and from which 
point the Northwest corner of said Section 10 bears North 2640 feet and West 1281.6 feet. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of July, 2000, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid to the following: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. Esq. 
Nelson Snuffer Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
J. 
Bruce J. Nelson 
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ADDENDUM F 
Order of August 24,2000 
(Judge Taylor in Utah County lawsuit) 
Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968) 
Ross I. Romero (USB #7771) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff TWN, Inc. 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial D-sfncf Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
t 
&__ Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TWN, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UWE MICHEL, an individual, and 
ULLRICH MICHEL, an individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 990402593 
Honorable James Taylor 
On July 26, 2000 at 2:30 p.m., TWN, Inc. ("Plaintiff), by and through its counsel of 
record, Randall N. Skanchy and Ross I. Romero, and Uwe Michel and Ullrich Michel 
("Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, Bruce J. Nelson appeared at a hearing 
held before the Honorable James Taylor, on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. At the hearing Plaintiff and Defendants, 
455823v! 
through counsel, made arguments in support of their motions. The Court having reviewed the 
pleadings, heard argument and for other good cause shown, 
ORDERED, that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied and Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, the Court however reserving to the Defendants sixty 
days (60) from the date of this Order to conduct discovery on the sole issue of proof of 
Defendants' claim of ownership of the disputed property by way of adverse possession. If 
Defendants do not provide the Court with any additional evidence on the issue of adverse 
possession at the end of sixty days (60), the Court will enter an Order granting Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment in full. ^ Q INK 
DATED this QM day of August, 200 
O 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
NELSON, RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Attorney for Defendants 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Randall J 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / -~ day of August, 2000,1 cause to be hand 
delivered, sent via facsimile a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to the following: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
NELSON, RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM G 
Stipulated Facts of October 4,2001 
,i "W I il Ul 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TWN, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UWE MICHEL, an individual, and ULLRICH 
MICHEL, an individual, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
Civil No. 990402593 
Judge James Taylor 
The parties above-named, by and through their counsel of record, stipulate and agree to 
the accuracy of the following facts without the necessity of submitting further evidence to 
establish the same: 
1. Prior to 1984 (and thereafter until 1995), Utah County sent out tax billings on the 
following parcel of real property (the "Property"). The Property serial number was B-324-A-B: 
Commencing 1979 feet West from the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter 
of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and 
running thence South 2603.3 feet; West 1374.6 feet; North 2630.3 feet; and East 
1374.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
2. The Property consisted of 83 acres of undeveloped property which (unknown to 
Utah County or Salt Lake County) was situated in both Salt Lake County and Utah County. The 
majority of the Property was located in Utah County, and a minority of the Property was located 
508854v2 11144.0001 
in Salt Lake County. Due to survey errors corrected in or about 1995 (see Paragraph 8, below), 
Utah County believed the Property to be located entirely within Utah County in 1984. 
3. Property taxes became delinquent from the billings issued by Utah County. 
4. In May of 1984, Utah County conducted an auditor's tax sale on the Property for 
delinquent taxes. 
5. The Property was purchased at the tax sale by Richard Christenson. An Auditor's 
Tax Deed dated June 29, 1984, was issued to Richard Christenson and recorded with the Utah 
County Recorder on July 18, 1984, as Entry No. 21303 in Book 2150 at Page 588. 
6. On September 12, 1985, a March 19, 1985, Quit-Claim Deed to the Property was 
recorded from "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee" to Zions First National Bank. Zions First 
National Bank had owned the Property prior to the tax sale. Such Quit-Claim Deed was recorded 
with the office of the Utah County Recorder as Entry No. 26380 in Book 2245 at Page 405. 
7. Utah County also assessed the Property in the 1985 and 1986 tax years. 
8. In 1995, pursuant to a survey conducted by the Utah and Salt Lake County 
Surveyors' offices, it was determined that a portion of the Property was actually located in Salt 
Lake County. Thereafter, and through the current time, Utah County has assessed only 77.224 
acres of the Property and takes the position that such portion of the Property is located in Utah 
County. 
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9. TWN acquired its claimed interest in the Property pursuant to a Quit-Claim Deed 
from Richard A. Christenson dated December $,1998, and recorded in the office of the Utah 
County Recorder on December 17, 1998, as Entry No. 132243 in Book 4904 at Page 845. 
DATED this V day of October, 2001. 
Vincent C. Rampton 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
j> £h 
sruce J. Nelson 
NELSON, RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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ADDENDUM H 
Memorandum Decision and Order of 
November 8,2001 (Judge Taylor) 
Fourth JuH C'J f. -/nr! Court 
of Utah County Siale of Utah 
/M'MI / _ Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TWN, Inc. a Utah corporation, : 
Plaintiff : Memorandum Decision and Order 
vs. : Date: November 8,2001 
Uwe Michel, et. al., : Case Number: 990402593 
Defendant : Division V: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter comes before the Court upon an issue raised following trial. Counsel have 
submitted stipulated facts and have briefed the issue for the Court. The argument of the 
Defendants is rejected. 
Much of this case was decided, prior to trial, by summary judgment. This Court explicitly 
determined all issues raised in the case except whether the Defendants could establish title by 
adverse possession. Trial was held on March 27, 2001. Following the presentation of their case 
on that point the Court ruled that they could not succeed on that point. The Court esdorod the * 
C*GO dismissed and directed coun&ei for che Plaintiff to prepare an appropriate order. Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but no order, were submitted and signed by the Court. 
A motion for attorney fees was filed by the Plaintiff on April 10, 2001. The Defendant's 
responded to the Motion for Fees on April 26, 2001 and, on May 3, 2001, asked the Court to 
rule. On that same date the Defendants filed "Defendant's Objections to Proposed Findings and 
Conclusions (Amended) Submitted April 25, 2001." The Court notes that amended proposed 
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findings were not submitted to the Court on April 25 although they probably were circulated to 
counsel at about that time. It is in this objection that the Defendants, for the first time, formally 
raised the issue now argued, that is, that a portion of the property conveyed in the tax deed of 
1984 actually was located outside of Utah County. The Plaintiff responded to the objection and 
the matter was set for oral argument on June 5, 2001. At the hearing the motion for attorney fees 
was denied. The Court perceived that the parties were not in substantial disagreement as to 
relevant facts on this issue but that they had different views of the law. Counsel were asked to 
prepare a stipulated statement of fact and to submit more extensive briefs. Although that 
procedure has taken some time, the briefing is now complete and the Court is ready to rule on the 
issue. 
The Plaintiffs argue, first of all, that the Defendants should not be entitled to bring this 
new issue before the Court after summary judgment and trial on a narrow and different issue. The 
Court has allowed the question to be heard because of the argument that the question was not 
procedural but jurisdictional. Jurisdiction cannot be waived or created by stipulation. 
Nevertheless, after considering the briefs and stipulated facts ihe Court is saxisfied that this 
question is not jurisdictional and that the Court did have jurisdiction to issue a final judgment as 
ordered. The issue was not raised in a timely manner and should not, therefore, have been 
considered. 
The forgoing notwithstanding, the Court also rules, in the alternative, that the statute of 
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limitations regarding tax deeds is plenary and bars the argument made in this case. Tax deeds are 
meant to establish a title which can be absolutely relied upon once the four year statute of 
limitations has passed. Any deed executed and recorded on property similarly situated would 
have appeared on the records of Utah County but not in Salt Lake County. There is no question 
raised in the stipulated facts as to exactly what property was included within the tax deed 
description, only the relationship between the property and the county line. The Court finds that 
the statute of limitations with regard to tax deeds is intended to end any and all possible 
challenges to such deeds. The claim raised by the Defendants here is, therefore, barred. 
An order incorporating this Court's conclusions as expressed in the findings executed on 
April 3, 2001 has never been submitted to the Court. The Court finds that such a further order 
would be superfluous. The findings are hereby reaffirmed. This case is di«B§#ged by this order. 
No further order need be submitted. This is intended to be the final ruling of this Court on this 
matter. ^tb*****^ 
s 
Dated this 8th day of November, 200 K? 
Judge James R. 
Fourth Judicial District 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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TWN v. UWE 990402593 Memorandum Decision and Order 11/9/01 
Copies of this Order mailed to: 
Counsel for the Plaintiff: 
Vincent C. Rampton 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Counsel for the Defendant: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
576 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Mailed this J_ day of / / ^{ 2001, postage pre-paid as noted above. 
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ADDENDUM I 
§§ 78-12-5.2 and 5.3, Utah Code Annotated 
(Tax Sale Statute of Limitations) 
7842-5.2. H o l d e r of t a x t i t l e — L i m i t a t i o n s of ac t ion o r 
de fense — P r o v i s o . 
No action or defense for the recovery or possession of real 
property or to quiet title or determine the ownership thereof 
shall be commenced or interposed against the holder of a tax 
title after the expiration of four years from the date of the sale, 
conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, or 
directly to any other purchase thereof at any public or private 
tax sale and after the expiration of one year from the date of 
this act. Provided, however, tha t this section shall not bar any 
action or defense by the owner of the legal title to such 
property where he or his predecessor has actually occupied or 
been in actual possession of such property within four years 
from the commencement or interposition of such action or 
defense. And provided further, tha t this section shall not bar 
any defense by a city or town, to an action by the holder of a 
tax title, to the effect tha t such city or town holds a lien 
against such property which is equal or superior to the claim 
of the holder of such tax title. 1953 
78-12-5.3. Def in i t ions of " t ax t i t l e " a n d "ac t ion ." 
(1) The term "tax title" as used in Section 78-12-5.2 and 
Section 59-2-1364, and the related amended Sections 78-12-5, 
78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any title to real property, 
whether valid or not, which has been derived through or is 
dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or transfer of property 
in the course of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of 
any tax levied against the property whereby the property is 
relieved from a tax lien. 
(2) The word "action" as used in these sections includes 
counterclaims and cross-complaints and all civil actions 
wherein affirmative relief is sought. 1987 
